How does the sociological theory of human rights developed by Ben Turner contrast with the social constructionist approach?

From Hitler’s Nazism to the Asad regime in Syria, the dropping of the Atomic bomb in 1945 to abuses at Abu Ghraib in Iraq, issues concerning human rights have been a continuous presence in recent history. Today, ‘there is much talk of human rights’ (Cassese cited in Waters, M: 1996). With the increasing awareness of human rights has come debate surrounding the very meaning of this internationally politically charged term - many are now questioning the concept of human rights: what they are, if and how they are constructed and why they vary by country. The conflicting approaches of Brian Turner’s universalism and Malcolm Walters’ social constructionism have shaped recent sociological human rights discourse: Turner stating that human rights are based on a fundamental universal of frailty (Turner, B, 1993: 489); Waters that human rights are a social construction of the political elite (Waters, M, 1996). In an increasingly globalised world, with the boundaries between nation states weakening and the continuing presence of human rights abuses, we must address the conflict between social constructionist theory and universalism, to fully understand what is at stake in these differences within the sociology of human rights. 

Sociology has an awkward relationship with human rights. In contemporary sociology, the nature of rights has been largely ignored - though important, analysis of human rights presents a problem for the discipline (Turner, B, 1993: 489). In Outline of a Theory of Human Rights, Turner states that there has been a ‘silence about rights in sociology’, which is ‘interesting for two reasons’, firstly, the ‘contests over rights as claims or entitlements are a major feature of modern social life’ and secondly, ‘The institutionalisation of rights through the United Nations charter has to be regarded as a central aspect of the social process of globalisation’ (Robertson cited in Turner, B, 1993: 490). Equally, Weissbrodt describes international human rights ‘as the world’s first universal ideology’ (Weissbrodt cited in Turner, B, 1993: 490). While human rights debates and legislation are features of socio-political processes and modern institutions worldwide, sociology apparently possesses no unanimous theory of rights. This absence stems from a somewhat Durkheimian approach to the subject, following his positivistic standpoint towards law, that robs the idea of ‘rights’ of normative content and argues that sociology was to observe social facts as things, not to philosophise over them (Turner, B, 1993: 490). Such an approach is confusing, given the sociological importance of understanding and questioning. Aside what is at stake for sociology within the difference between universalism and social constructionism, ignoring the question altogether is arguably more damaging for the sociology of human rights. 

Turner himself has not ignored the question of human rights, presenting universalism in Outline of a Theory of Human Rights (Turner, B, 1993). He asserts that human rights should be held by all, regardless of culture, national, religious and policy differences and his argument stems from belief that human beings are ontologically frail, and their social arrangements precarious. He states that humans ‘require a more secure political and social environment to provide discipline, if social stability is to be maintained’ (Gehlen cited in Turner, B, 1993: 501) and that ‘the core of rights is the idea of a protective arrangement which…allows individuals or groups to seek redress for wrongs and to make claims for security.’ (Turner, B, 1993:507).  Though in aiming to be both sociological and universal, Turner’s article is unique, Waters suggests that he seems unable to state why some human rights claims are institutionalised and not others. (Waters, M, 1996: 593, 595) Waters himself offers the theory of social construction against Turner’s universalism. Waters argues that human rights are essentially a myth reflecting the prevailing balance of political interests, specific to cultural and historical context. Waters goes on to say that the attempt to give an account of human rights by reference to some inherent aspect of humanity is an attempt to construct the universality of human rights. (Waters, M, 1996)  Arguably, that we even have a Declaration of Human Rights illustrates their social constructionist nature, as if they were universal, surely we would be intrinsically aware of them. While Turner argues for the universality of human rights in light of human frailty, Waters argument suggests that universality is itself a human construct. (Waters, M, 1996) 

We must assess what is at stake for the sociology of human rights within the differences in Turner and Waters’ theories. Arguably, Waters’ critique of Turner’s universalism in Human Rights and the Universalization of Interests, and his own theory of social constructionism, highlights three key problems with Turner’s theory: firstly, if human rights are universal, why are some institutionalised and others not; secondly, the western dominance in human rights discourse and conflict between diversity and universalism; thirdly, the validity of the concept of human frailty as the basis of universalism. These issues and the contrast in sociological theory go some way to identifying what is at stake for the sociology of human rights, and should be addressed in some detail. 

Firstly, universalism cannot explain the institutionalisation of some human rights but not others. A pertinent example is the devastating consequences of the East Asian financial deregulation in the 1990s. Though The Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living…’ damage done to another economy does not constitute a violation of human rights’ (Asad, T, 2003: 128,129). Moreover, while military action is not the only or most important form of intervention of powerful states, others, such as extreme financial pressures from other nations are not classed as human rights violations. The limited reach of supposedly ‘universal’ rights is evident in the lack of animal rights regulation, something that is currently being contested by the Nonhuman Rights Project (The Guardian, 2013), Asad stating that ‘only humans have rights based on their awareness of violation of moral or legal rule’ (Asad, T, 2003:131). Moreover, Malcolm X addressed this discrepancy of institutionalisation, telling an audience that ‘human rights are something you were born with’ (Asad, T, 2003:144), however, African Americans were born American (with US citizenship rights), and were humans who happened to be black (only white people were full humans). One aspect of birth diminished the other, because citizenship and the status of being human, although connected, are not identical.’(Asad, T, 2003:144). Such examples reflect prevailing political interests, identifying a positivistic, not universalistic view, locating the emergence of human rights within historical configurations of interests. Furthermore, they illustrate that from a social constructionist perspective, human rights can encompass only what a political community recognises as fundamental to members’ humanity. Waters argues that ‘institutionalisation of human rights is a product of the balance of power between political interests’ (Waters, M, 1996: 595) - it is politically convenient for the powerful to institute some human rights, but not others. In such, deeper sociological questions are presented, of how we ensure all humans are treated fairly without simply impressing western values as a sort of human-rights-sticking-plaster. 

Secondly, the increase in human rights discourse as an effective way of accessing social advantage is prevalent in current criticism of human rights as a western construction. In establishing universalities in human rights, universal human diversity can be neglected. On the extent to which the construction of human rights promotes western control, Waters states that ‘in specifying the conditions for the original enforcement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.’ three of four key motives were in the interest of the creators of the declaration, the western victors of the Second World War (Waters, M, 1996: 597). Waters argues that ‘Turner’s theoretical outline… [fails] to explain…that the emergence of human rights claims and institutions is undeniably occidental. Explaining the point of origin involves similar difficulties to those faced by Marx in explaining the rise of capitalism.’ (Waters, M, 1996: 597). Marx stated that within society people were co-operative, but in economic roles were competitive, resulting in the theory of rights expressing the division of human beings - a façade hiding economic and social inequalities. Though questionable human rights in Eastern Europe make Marx’s legacy politically suspect (Turner, B, 1993: 492,493), his contribution is interesting, and suggests human rights represent not a universalization of human frailty but a universalization of human interests (Waters, M, 1996: 599). Consequently, sociologists must assess the western domination of current human rights – surely they are actually a universalization of western interests, not international human interests. Constructing truly universal human rights, supported by all would be far harder, and as stated, could deny this notion of universal human diversity. 

Thirdly, Waters takes issue with Turner’s theory that ‘embodied frailty is a human universal condition’ (Turner, B, 1993:489). Waters highlights this flaw in Turner’s argument, when he argues that ‘just because other animal species are corporeally vulnerable this does not mean that human rights should be extended to them.’ (Waters, M, 1996: 595). Given that there are varying levels of human frailty this concept should be addressed, particularly the validity of it as a basis for human rights. Marshall states that there is ‘no easy liberal answer to critics who pointed out that the classic freedoms (of speech, association, religion and so forth) were ineffective tokens for the majority of the population who lived in poverty’ (Turner, B: 1993). Moreover, Waters supports this statement saying that ‘Turner is arguing that human rights claims are made against strong and threatening institutions’ (Waters, M, 1996: 596). In this, arguably unconsciously, Turner is conceding to the role of social constructionism in human rights, as humans create institutions, therefore, we must create the rights that protect us from their power. Sociologists must address this paradox of those in power creating human rights to ‘protect’ humanity from injustices of power.

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’ (Declaration of Human Rights, 1948), yet we are born with rights because other humans have decided as such. Fundamentally, it is easy to say that rights should be based on universalism, applied to all as protection. Only when we start to question universalism and address the contrast with social constructionism do we ask how and why we have human rights. Evidently, rights are not biologically ‘ours’ in the way that we can see or hear from birth, and given that countries choose to follow, or ignore, human rights, it becomes apparent that we acquire rights in a socio-political context. The fact that a campaign for universal human rights exists illustrates that human beings are not born free and equal. Turner argues that sociology has been critical of the idea of the ‘human’ as a universal category in human rights and the adoption of a social constructionist view. (Turner, B, 1993: 500) Waters, on the other had, states that ‘an adequate sociological theory of human rights must take a social-constructionist view, that human rights is an institution specific to cultural and historical context, and that universality is itself a human construction.’ (Waters, M, 1996: 598). Equally, it is interesting to note that ‘human rights activism refuses the political mantle… it generally presents itself as something of an anti-politics—a defence of the innocent and the powerless against power’ (Brown, W, 2004). Given Brown’s statement, and the conflict surrounding human rights theories, it is appropriate to ask if the difference between social constructionism and universalism really matters. The importance of the need to discuss human rights can be lost in arguments over differing theories of human rights, when it is more vital that the occidental human rights discourse is addressed, if human rights (albeit socially constructed) are to apply internationally. Although human rights are arguably socially constructed, this does not negate their extreme importance in the modern world. If such debates concerning the theories of universalism and social constructionism are to continue, however, then ultimately, we are in danger of putting the goal of international human rights at stake, simply for the sake of contesting these two sociological theories of human rights. 

Bibliography

 1.     Turner, B (1993) Outline of a Theory of Human Rights (Oxford University Press)

2.     Waters, M (1996) Human Rights and the Universalization of Interests (London: Oxford University Press)

3.     Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, United Nations

4.     Asad, T (2003) Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity. (Stanford, California: Stanford Universtiy Press) 

5.     Brown, W (2004) ‘The Most We Can Hope For…’: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism 

6.     http://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2013/dec/03/chimpanzees-human-rights-us-lawyer